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NOTES
PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN MONTANA: AT LAST A
WORD ON DEFENSE
Sharon M. Morrison
For five years following the landmark case of Brandenburger v.
Toyota Motor Sales,' the status of a plaintiff's contributory negli-
gence in a products liability action brought in Montana was unclear.
In Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co.,' the Montana
Supreme Court recently allowed an instruction which, in effect, told
the jury that a plaintiff's contributory negligence would not bar
recovery, but that assumption of risk would. The purpose of this
note is to discuss Brown and its effect on the present and future
status of contributory negligence in Montana.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Brandenburger, the Montana Supreme Court adopted the
doctrine of strict liability in tort for injuries resulting from defective
products.3 In that case, the court said it was approving "the
definition as other jurisdictions have, set forth in 2 Restatement of
Torts 2d § 402A . ... "I
Contributory negligence was not an issue in that case, however,
and the opinion did not discuss whether in an appropriate case it
would also follow the Restatement view on that subject. Strictly
reading the ratio decidendi, one must concede that only the core
definition of section 402A 5 was accepted in Brandenburger.
1. 162 Mont. 506, 513 P.2d 268 (1973).
2. - Mont...., 576 P.2d 711 (1978).
3. The theory, commonly called products liability, grew in part out of the case of
Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962),
in which Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court applied strict liability to a manu-
facturer in a tort case. In 1965, the doctrine appeared in section 402A of RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS (1965). By 1970, two-thirds of the states had adopted the theory.
Brandenburger was the key case in an exhaustive products liability survey compiled in
1977 by Carl Tobias and William Rossbach. See Tobias and Rossbach, A Framework for
Analysis of Products Liability in Montana, 39 MONT. L. REv. 221 (1977).
4. 162 Mont. at 513, 513 P.2d at 272 (emphasis added).
5. Cited id. at 513, 513 P.2d at 272-73, the section reads as follows:
Section 402A Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to this property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
1
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II. THE DILEMMA
Under section 402A of the Restatement, most forms of contribu-
tory negligence are not defenses to a strict liability action.' Frumer
and Friedman point out, however, that the "language of the courts
in dealing with contributory negligence as a defense to either war-
ranty or strict liability is in confusion .... ,, This minor chaos
seems to grow out of a failure on the part of the courts to isolate and
identify the nature of plaintiff's conduct being considered in each
situation. In order to help analyze the cases, it is necessary to decide
what type of plaintiff conduct bars recovery and then decide
whether the plaintiff's conduct was of the fatal variety. The assign-
ment is not given to easy solution, however, because of the semantic
obstacle course created by case law and by the Restatement itself.
The concept of contributory negligence as a defense early was
rejected by the Restatement in section 524 as to torts involving
abnormally dangerous activity." Comment n to section 402A of the
Restatement, although making reference to section 524,1 confused
the issue by setting out two types of conduct, both bearing the same
name, but having the opposite effect in a products liability action.
The comment reads in part:
Contributory negligence ... is not a defense when such negli-
gence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect or to guard
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule as stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment n (1965), reads as follows:
Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when such negligence
consists merely in a failure to discover the defect in the product, or to guard against
the possibility of its existence. On the other hand the form of contributory negli-
gence which consists in voluntarily and unreasonably encountering a known danger,
and commonly passes under assumption of risk, is a defense under this section as
in other cases of strict liability. If the user or consumer discovers the defect and is
aware of the danger, and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the
product and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.
7. 2 FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIALIYr § 16A(5)(f) (1965).
8. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 (1965) provides:
Since the strict liability of one who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity
is not founded on his negligence, the ordinary contributory negligence of the plain-
tiff is not a defense to an action based on strict liability. The reason is the policy
of the law that places the full responsibility for preventing the harm resulting from
abnormally dangerous activities upon the person who has subjected others to the
abnormal risk.
9. Id. Section 402A, Comment n reads in part: "Since the liability with which this
section deals is not based upon negligence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied
to strict liability cases (see §524) applies." 2
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against the possibility of its existence. On the other hand, the form
of contributory negligence which consists in voluntarily and unrea-
sonably proceeding to encounter a known danger and commonly
passes under the name of assumption of the risk, is a defense under
the section . . ..
Most commentators and virtually all jurisdictions agree that, while
contributory negligence of the first type does not bar recovery,"
contributory negligence of the second type will.' 2
Analysis is further complicated by those jurisdictions which
categorize "misuse" by the plaintiff as an affirmative defense.' 3 This
view places the burden on the defendant to show that the plaintiff
did not use the product in a way reasonably foreseeable by the
manufacturer. In those jurisdictions, misuse takes its place beside
contributory negligence consisting of assumption of risk in barring
recovery by plaintiff.
Other jurisdictions, however, point out what seems to be the
better-reasoned position on misuse-that "[a]lthough some writers
refer to abnormal use (a use not reasonably anticipated) as a defense
to the action, it is not properly a defense, but a necessary element
of plaintiff's cause of action."'"
In Montana, as in other jurisdictions, the effect of contributory
negligence in product liability cases has been unclear. The confu-
sion is primarily attributable to two post-Brandenburger, pre-
Brown cases, Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales 5 and Duncan v. Rockwell
Manufacturing Co. '6 The opinions in both cases appeared to recog-
nize some type of contributory negligence as a defense to a products
action.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. See, e.g., Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976). See also Jackson
v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974); Findlay v. Copeland Lumber Co.,
265 Ore. 300, 509 P.2d 28 (1973).
12. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 IIl. 481, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970). Some
jurisdictions apply comparative negligence to assumption of risk conduct. See, e.g., Sell
Teagle v. Fisher & Porter Co., 89 Wash. 2d 149, 570 P.2d 438 (1977).
13. See Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681
(1970); Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 545 11. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970); Epstein, Products
Liability, 1968 UTAH L. REV. 267.
14. Rogers v. Toro Mfg., 522 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. App. 1975), citing 38 So. CAL. L.
REv. 30 (1965). See also 2 FUME & FRIEDMAN, PaODucrs Lumrrv 16A(4)(e)(ii) (1965): "The
task of claimant's counsel is to show that the damaging event resulted in the course of a
normal use of the product and not from an unforeseeable misuse." Montana apparently is in
accord. See Barrich v. Ottenstror, - Mont .... 550 P.2d 395, 398 (1976), where
the court said, "While a specific defect need not be shown where the evidence tends to negate
injury producing causes which do not relate to a defect, this rule cannot be applied unless
the evidence also negates the misuse or mishandling of the product by plaintiff."
15. 166 Mont. 217, 531 P.2d 1341 (1975).
16. - Mont. -. , 567 P.2d 936 (1977).
1979]
3
Morrison: Products Liability in Montana: At Last a Word on Defense
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1979
MONTANA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
A. Oltz v. Toyota Motor Sales
Oltz was a products liability action involving the same accident
which gave rise to the Brandenburger case. Both were second colli-
sion cases." Oltz was driving and Brandenburger was riding with
him in a 1969 Toyota Land Cruiser automobile. Oltz, swerving to
avoid some rocks on the road, lost control of the car which left the
road and overturned. The fiberglass top popped off, the two men
were thrown out, Brandenburger was killed, and Oltz was injured.
Recovery was allowed in Brandenburger and denied in Oltz.
In affirming the trial court's summary judgment for defendants
in Oltz, Justice Harrison, writing for the majority, foreclosed the
plaintiff's right to recover because of "his own contributory negli-
gence in the operation of the vehicle."'"
Measured against the principles enunciated in Brandenburger,
the rationale for the decision is questionable.' 9 It must be noted that
the court in Brandenburger premised that decision on the holding
that "the duty of Toyota to provide a safe roof is not eliminated
simply because the defective roof did not cause the accident."2' For
purposes of analysis, then, a "second collision" products liability
case should not be distinguishable, either as to liability or defenses,
from one in which the defect is the primary cause of the accident.
17. "Second collision" was at the time of Brandenburger an emerging doctrine. The
theory is explained in Brandenburger as follows:
In the recent years courts have held that where the manufacturer's negligence in.
design causes an unreasonable risk to be imposed upon the user of its products, the
manufacturer should be liable for injury caused by its failure to use reasonable care
in design. These injuries are readily foreseeable as an incident to the normal and
expected use of the car. While automobiles are not made for the purpose of colliding
with each other, a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use
will result in collisions and injury producing impacts.
162 Mont. at 516, 513 P.2d at 274.
18. 166 Mont. at 220, 531 P.2d at 1343.
19. Tobias & Rossbach, supra note 3, at 279, n. 342, points out that:
[Tihere is considerable ground for questioning the reasoning and authority the
court used in reaching its decision. Justice Castles [sic] said the court had exam-
ined the authorities cited by both parties before deciding; however, neither of the
cases cited in the opinion in any way supports the decision reached. The first,
Adams v. Ford Motor Co., 103 Ill. App.2d 356, 243 N.E.2d 843 (1968), was a lower
appellate court opinion which had been effectively overruled by the Illinois Su-
preme Court nearly five years before the Oltz decision. In Adams, the court relied
on an earlier opinion which was specifically reversed by the supreme court in Wil-
liams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill.2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305 (1970).
The second case relied on, General Motors Corp. v. Walden, 406 F.2d 606 (10th
Cir. 1969), did not even involve second collision liability or the defense of contribu-
tory negligence. The trial court had given certain instructions regarding the negli-
gence of the plaintiff as a defense, but the appellate court made it clear that the
instructions dealt with misuse of the product, not contributory negligence, Id. at
680.
20. 162 Mont. at 517, 513 P.2d at 274. 4
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Nonetheless, the court in Oltz concluded that contributory negli-
gence in the operation of a vehicle sufficient to cause it to leave the
roadway was a proper defense to an action for failure to design a
crashworthy vehicle.'
The court could not have rested its decision on a finding that
Oltz "voluntarily and unreasonably proceeded to encounter a
known danger" thus assuming the risk, because the opinion con-
ceded that "the alleged manufacturing defect was unknown to the
operator. '2 Neither is it likely that the court hung its decision on
the peg of misuse, since the same court concluded in Brandenburger
on the same facts that injuries from automobile accidents are
"readily foreseeable [by the manufacturer] as an incident to the
normal and expected use of the car. 2 3
There are four possible explanations for the Oltz holding. The
court could have intended that contributory negligence in all forms
be a defense to a products liability action. In view of the earlier clear
adoption in Brandenburger of secton 402A and the policy reasons
there expounded, this interpretation seems unlikely. Second, the
court may have read Comment n narrowly to excuse only "the fail-
ure to discover the defect or to guard against the posssibility of its
existence." Third, the opinion may have distinguished between
gross and ordinary negligence of a plaintiff. Finally, the court may
not have intended that contributory negligence bar recovery, but
rather intended to carve out an exception in second collision cases
where the plaintiff is the driver.
To the extent that the Oltz opinion held that any form of negli-
gence, gross or ordinary, is a defense in a products liability case, the
holding is impliedly overruled by Brown. If the case is rationalized
according to the fourth theory, the decision is out of harmony with
the Brandenburger-Brown philosophy and should be overruled at
the first opportunity.2"
21. The court in Oltz said:
We have carefully examined the authorities cited by both parties and hold that
where, as here, in a strict liability case involving an alleged manufacturing defect
that was unknown to the operator and which apparently had nothing to do with
causing the accident in question but merely contributory negligence [sic] in the
operation of the vehicle so as to cause it to leave the highway is a proper defense.
166 Mont. at 220, 531 P.2d at 1343.
22. Id.
23. 162 Mont. at 517, 513 P.2d at 274.
24. Oltz is contrary to the prevailing judicial trend toward allowing recovery in second
collision cases. No case was found where a jurisdiction adopted the second collision doctrine
but foreclosed recovery by the injured driver. See generally Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d
795 (8th Cir. 1976); Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1978). See also
cases collected in Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d 560 (1972).
1979]
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B. Duncan v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co.
Duncan v. Rockwell Manufacturing Co. 5 was also before the
court on a summary judgment. The plaintiff contended on appeal
that the issue of contributory negligence was not susceptible of sum-
mary judgment. In affirming the judgment on other grounds, the
court said, "We need not consider whether summary judgment was
the proper vehicle in the instant case for establishing contributory
negligence as a matter of law. 26 It could well be inferred that the
court there was saying contributory negligence would be a valid
defense in a trial on the merits."
Against the muddled background of Oltz and Duncan, the stage
was set for a case to clarify the issues of defenses in a products
liability action, and Brown came on the scene with the needed
issues at the opportune time. The court mulled over the decision
for five months. The case, submitted September 28, 1977, was
finally handed down February 9, 1978. Without expressly over-
ruling Oltz or explaining Duncan, the court in Brown announced
that contributory negligence is not a defense to an action in strict
liability.
Im. BROWN AND BEYOND
A. The Case
The leg of the plaintiff in Brown v. North American Manufac-
turing Co. 28 was severed above the knee by an auger in a Grain-O-
Vator feed distributing machine. The machine was one year old
when the plaintiff purchased it. He used it in his ranching operation
for the three years prior to the accident.
The plaintiff alleged that the machine was defectively designed
in that the "excess" door covering the auger Was hinged at the
bottom, thereby allowing the door to open and expose the operator
to potential danger. The injury occurred when plaintiff, after climb-
ing up to look into the grain bin, stepped back into the auger that
had been exposed by the unexpectedly opened excess door.
The defendant maintained that the plaintiff's injuries could
have been avoided had he turned off the power to the grain machine
before climbing into it. Accordingly, the defendant raised the de-
fense of contributory negligence in the pre-trial proceedings, but the
trial court granted the plaintiff's motion to strike that issue from the
25. - Mont. -, 567 P.2d 936 (1977).
26. Id. at -, 567 P.2d at 940 (emphasis added).
27. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Shea noted that "the basis of the district court's
ruling was that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. However, contributory
negligence is not a defense in a case involving strict liability." Id. at -, 567 P.2d at 941.
28. - Mont. -, 567 P.2d 711 (1978).
(Vol. 40
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case. The defendant did not appeal the ruling, apparently believing
that contributory negligence was not a valid defense. At the trial,
the defendant then urged the court to instruct the jury on assump-
tion of risk. The plaintiff's objections to a bare assumption of risk
instruction resulted in the court's Instruction No. 10 being given:
You are instructed that assumption of risk is voluntarily plac-
ing oneself in a position to chance known hazards. If a person has
assumed the risk, he cannot recover for any injury or damage sus-
tained by him. In determining whether plaintiff assumed the risk,
you are not to consider whether or not plaintiff exercised due care
for his own safety .... 21
The case turned on this instruction. 30 The language of the hold-
ing is somewhat less than concise, but the effect is clear. The court
refused to reverse the case because the instruction was given. In so
deciding, it held that it was not reversible error to instruct the jury
that contributory negligence in the form of failure to exercise due
care is not an issue in a products liability case, but that assumption
of risk will bar recovery. The court disapproved the instruction for
future cases, however, because it "improperly inserts contributory
negligence" into the case and "could cause jury confusion." 3'
Justice Haswell's concurring opinion states the holding more
succinctly: "As pointed out in the majority opinion, contributory
negligence is not a defense to a products liability case, but assump-
tion of risk is a complete bar to recovery. ' 32 He commented that in
his view Instruction No. 10 "is a correct statement of the law' 33 and
reiterated that it was the traditional lack of due care form of contri-
butory negligence about which the court was speaking in Brown. 34
Having ruled that a plaintiff's lack of due care is not a defense
in a products liability case, the opinion turned to the other type of
plaintiff conduct to be considered-the voluntary encounter with a
known risk. Justice Harrison, writing for the court, noted there was
some confusion as to the standard to be applied in an assumption
29. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 720 (emphasis added).
30. The opinion spoke decisively on the question of whether an open and obvious danger
is a defect. The issue was unsettled in Montana, but there is a split of authority generally.
The court erased all doubt as to its position, saying, "Defendant here advances the 'open and
obvious danger' or 'patent-latent' rule as a bar to plaintiff's recovery under the theory of strict
liability. We reject such a rule. " Id. at - , 576 P.2d at 717 (emphasis added). The court
said, "We reject any rule which would operate to encourage misdesign." Id.
The powerful language was dicta, however, because the court said the "evidence in the
instant case [tended] to support a finding that the danger was hidden, rather than open and
obvious. ... Id.
31. Id. at -' 576 P.2d at 721.
32. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 723.
33. Id.
34. Id.
1979]
7
Morrison: Products Liability in Montana: At Last a Word on Defense
Published by The Scholarly Forum @ Montana Law, 1979
MONTANA LAW REVIEW
of risk defense and succeeded in dispelling doubt about the future
law in Montana. He discussed the remaining part of Instruction No.
10 which dealt with voluntary assumption of risk. Drawn from the
Montana Jury Instruction Guide, 5 the instructions set out four fac-
tors to be considered in deciding whether the plaintiff assumed a
risk.36 The first requires the defendant to prove that the plaintiff had
knowledge, actual or implied, of the particular condition. Justice
Harrison said flatly that, in the future, "[i]n an instruction on
assumption of risk . . . the words 'actual' and 'implied' will not be
used,"17 and "in products cases the defense of assumption of risk will
be based on a subjective standard rather than that of a reasonable
man test.
'38
The Brown decision is an important development in Montana
products liability law. In Brandenburger, Justice Harrison ex-
plained the reasoning behind products liability: "The essential ra-
tionale for imposing the doctrine of strict liability in tort is that such
imposition affords the consuming public the maximum protection
from dangerous defects in manufactured products by requiring the
manufacturer to bear the burden of injuries and losses enhanced by
such defects in its products.319 This policy would not be served if a
plaintiff's conduct, however negligent, could excuse the manufac-
turer from his obligation.
B. A Suggested Framework for Evaluating the Plaintiff's Conduct
in a Products Liability Setting
Montana has the opportunity to start afresh in establishing a
clear framework for analysis of the plaintiff's conduct in a products
liability setting. Brown v. North American Manufacturing Co. 40 de-
clares that in Montana contributory negligence does not bar recov-
ery, but assumption of risk does. With Brown as a guideline, the
Montana Supreme Court will, it is hoped, carefully label and define
the acceptable and prohibited conduct on the part of the plaintiff
in future products liability cases. The author suggests that plaintiff
35. Committee on Montana Jury Instruction Guides (MJIG) of Montana Judges Asso-
ciation, Montana Jury Instruction Guide.
36. "1. That he had knowledge, actual or implied, of the particular condition.
2. That he appreciated the condition as dangerous.
3. Voluntarily remaining or continuing in the face of the known dangerous condition.
4. Injury resulting as the usual or probable consequence of this dangerous condition.
If you find all four of the above factors did exist at the time of the plaintiff's injury, he
cannot recover." - Mont. at -, 576 P.2d at 720.
37. Id. at , 76 P.2d at 721.
38. Id. at -, 576 P.2d at 719.
39. 162 Mont. at 517, 513 P.2d at 275.
40. - Mont. -, 576 P.2d 711 (1978).
[Vol. 40
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conduct which will not bar recovery be labeled "contributory negli-
gence," which should be defined as "failure to exercise due care."
This definition is broader than the one set out in Comment n of
section 402A,4 where the excusable activity is "failure to discover
the defect or to guard against the possibility of its existence." The
only other conduct offered for consideration by Comment n is as-
sumption of risk. Arguably, this leaves between the two defined
standards a wide variety of plaintiff activity for which there is no
rule. The proposed Brown rule would draw the total range of plain-
tiff conduct within defined and predictable categories thereby clos-
ing the gap left by Comment n.
An overwhelming number of jurisdictons have gone beyond the
restrictive parameters of the Restatement. Some cite Comment n,42
but interpret it to say that "conventional contributory negligence of
the plaintiff is not a defense.' 3 Acceptable conduct has been de-
scribed by other courts as "inadvertance, momentary inattention" 4
and "a garden variety type of negligence which would not insulate
defendants from liability." 5 The majority doctrine has been sum-
marized as follows: "Generally, simple, ordinary, or traditional con-
tributory negligence is not a defense in an action based on strict
liability.""
It is further urged that plaintiff conduct which does bar recov-
ery be labeled "assumption of risk," which should be defined as
"voluntarily and unreasonably encountering dangers actually
known to the actor." In order to clarify opinions in products liabil-
ity, the use of the term "contributory negligence" for assumption of
risk conduct should be abrogated in Montana. 47 It is submitted that
41. See supra, note 6.
42. See, e.g., Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 426, 261 N.E.2d 305, 309-10
(1970).
43. See, e.g., Pizza Inn, Inc. v. Tiffany, 454 S.W.2d 420, 423 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970).
44. Elder v. Crawley Book Mach. Co., 441 F.2d 771, 774 (3rd Cir. 1971).
45. Gangi v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 Conn. Sup. 81, 360 A.2d 907, 909 (1976).
46. 72 C.J.S. Products Liability § 45 (Supp. 1975). The concept extends to more than
ordinary negligence. In Melia v. Ford Motor Co., 534 F.2d 795 (8th Cir. 1976), a second
collision case, the trial court excluded evidence that the plaintiffs decedent, driving at
excessive speeds, entered an intersection on a red light. The court of appeals affirmed, saying
contributory negligence was not a defense to a products liability action.
47. This change would not be inconsistent with the court's position with respect to the
comments to secton 402A. Justice Shea, writing for the majority in Stenberg v. Beatrice Foods
Co., - Mont. - , 576 P.2d 725, 729 (1978), said:
We emphasize that this Court adopted the rule as set out in the Restatement,
but we did not and do not intend the restraints in the comments to this rule to
hamstring us in developing and defining the rule of strict liability. To the extent
that the comments are helpful in our development of the law, we shall accept them;
but we will reject them where we believe a more appropriate explanation of the rule
of strict liability can be provided.
1979]-
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such a framework as is here outlined implements the policy consid-
erations set out in Brandenburger48 and reflects the positive steps
taken in Brown.
48. See Brandenburger, 162 Mont. at 514, 515, 513 P.2d at 273.
10
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